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THE RESPONSE OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND
POLICY TO THE ABOLITION OF TAX
CREDIT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM (U.K.)
By abolishing the tax credit on dividends received by tax-exempt
financial institutions in 1997, the effective rate of tax for share-
holders such as pension funds increases significantly, and the tax
preference for dividends is significantly reduced. The tax-exempt
shareholders mainly consist of pension funds and insurance compa-
nies with respect to their pension business. This tax-exempt commu-
nity is the most influential shareholders in many U.K. companies,
and their tax preference for dividends may have an important impact
on corporate dividend policy.
The objective of this study is to examine whether the aggregate
dividend payment changes following the 1997 abolition of the tax
credit. Using aggregate data in time series from 1974 to 1999, this
study finds that the percentage of forecast error in Lintner’s model
does not change significantly between the pre- and post-abolition
periods. Hence, there is no evidence that aggregate dividend pay-
ment decreases following the abolition of tax credit. This could be
interpreted that the aggregate sample of U.K. firms indicates a little
intention of changing their dividend policies in response to the
abolition of tax credit.
This study also investigates whether individual U.K. companies
respond to the 1997 abolition of tax-credit. The test results show that
the majority of companies in the sample do not change their dividend
policies after the abolition of tax credit. It is possible that companies
are reluctant to cut their dividend payment since the existing divi-
dend payout could be sustained in the long-run. They also avoid
sending negative signals to the market. Thus, companies typically
chose to keep a dividend level relatively stable following the tax
change in 1997. Only the minority of the U.K. companies experience
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Introduction
Since 1973, the U.K. government
has operated an imputation tax system
under which some tax relief on divi-
dend income is provided to all stock-
holders in recognition of corporation
tax paid by a company. The corpora-
tion tax is payable in two installments.
The first payment (Advance Corpora-
tion Tax) is carried out soon after the
company pays its dividends, and is
assessed on the amount of the divi-
dends. The rate of Advance Corpora-
tion Tax (ACT) is set equal to the lower
band rate of  income tax on dividend
from 1994 (previously the basic rate).
For instance, in 1998, the U.K. compa-
nies were taxed at a rate of 30 percent
on their taxable profits (see Table 1).
The ACT was paid at a rate of 20
percent on the gross dividends received
by a shareholder.
The second payment of corporate
tax (Mainstream Corporation Tax) is
payable approximately 9 months after
the end of the firm’s accounting pe-
riod. The company can subtract the
ACT (the first payment) from its total
corporation tax liability, and pay the
difference between the total tax bill
and ACT already paid. In 1988, the
U.K. government abolished all rates of
income tax above 40 percent, thereby
reducing the top rate from 60 percent
to 40 percent. The basic rate of income
tax was cut from 30 percent to 29
percent in 1986, then to 27 percent in
1987, and to 25 percent in 1988. In
1993, the Conservative government
cut the tax credit (ACT) from 25 per-
cent to 20 percent. In 1997, the Labor
government proposed to reduce the tax
credit rate from 20 percent to 10 per-
cent starting in 1999. The government
also reduced the top corporate tax rate
to 31 percent in 1997.
Table 2 shows the comparison of
dividend income received by share-
holders under the imputation tax sys-
tem and that received under the classi-
cal tax system. Suppose a company
has £1,000 of pre-tax profits distrib-
uted as dividends. Under the classical
system, the company will pay out
£1,000 (1-tc) to the shareholders, and
the shareholders will actually receive
the dividend income after tax as much
as £1,000 (1-tc)(1-m), where tc = cor-
porate tax and m = dividend income
tax. For instance, in 1996, if the corpo-
ration tax was equal to 33 percent, tax-
exempt shareholders (pension funds)
would receive dividend income after
tax of £670 [=£1,000 (1-0.33)(1-0%)].
If the corporation tax decreased by 2
percent in 1997 (tc=31%), the divi-
dend income after tax received by tax-
a decline in their dividend payment. This evidence supports the
hypothesis that the abolition of tax credit on dividends results in a
decrease in aggregate dividend payment in order to satisfy a tax
clientele.
Keywords: abolition of tax credit; aggregate dividend payment; dividend policy
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Table 1. UK Corporate Tax Rate, Dividend Income Tax Rate and Tax Credit
Rate (1987-1999)
Year Corporate Dividend Income Tax Rate (m) Tax Credit
Tax Rate Rate
(tc) (s)
1987 35% 27% 60% 0% 27%
1988 35% 25% 40% 0% 25%
1989 35% 25% 40% 0% 25%
1990 35% 25% 40% 0% 25%
1991 33% 25% 40% 0% 25%
1992 33% 25% 40% 0% 25%
1993 33% 25% 40% 0% 25%
1994 33% 20% 40% 0% 20%
1995 33% 20% 40% 0% 20%
1996 33% 20% 40% 0% 20%
1997 31% 20% 40% 0% 20%
1998 31% 20% 40% 0% 20%
1999 30% 10% 33% 0% 10%
* The rate of ACT was set equal to lower band rate from 1994 (previously basic rate).
Lower Rate* Top Rate Exempt
(Basic Rate)
Table 2.Comparison of Dividend Income under the Imputation Tax System
and the Classical Tax System
Dividend Income Received Dividend Income Received
By Shareholders By Shareholders
Under the IMPUTATION SYSTEM Under the CLASSICAL SYSTEM
(s =20%) £ 100*(1-tc)*(1-m)
£ 100*(1-tc)*(1-m) /(1-s)
Year Basic Rate Top Rate Exempt Year Basic Rate Top Rate Exempt
m=20% m=40% m=0% m =20% m=40% m=0%
1996 £ 670.0 £ 502.5 £ 837.5 1996 £ 536.0 £ 402.0 £ 670.0
(tc=33%) (tc=33%)
1997 £ 690.0 £ 517.5 £ 862.5 1997 £ 552.0 £ 414.0 £ 690.0
(tc=31%) (tc=31%)
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exempt shareholders were £690[=£
1000 (1-0.31)(1-0%)]. Hence, the lower
the corporate tax, other factors held
constant, the greater the dividend in-
come received by shareholders. The
shareholders would then pay personal
tax on the dividend received.
Under the U.K. imputation sys-
tem, stockholders receive net dividends
(of imputation rate), d, plus a tax credit
equal to the imputation rate (s) times
gross dividends; or the amount received
by stockholders is D = d / (1-s). For
instance, each stockholder receives
cash dividends of £0.8 per share, and
the company pays £0.2 per share in
ACT (Advanced Corporation Tax = 20
percent). Actually, an individual stock-
holder receives £0.8 (d) along with a
tax credit of £0.2 (s) representing the
ACT paid on their behalf; thus the
amount received by a shareholder is D
= £0.8/ (1-0.2) = £1.
In Table 2, the shareholders in
1996 would receive gross dividends of
£837.5 [=£1,000 (1-tc)/(1-s)]; where
the corporate tax (tc) = 33 percent and
the imputation rate (s) = 20 percent. A
tax-paying shareholder would be li-
able to personal income tax (m) such
that the shareholder actually receives
£1,000 (1-tc)(1-m)/(1-s). If a share-
holder is exempt from tax (m= 0%),
she is effectively receiving a dividend
of £837.5. [=£1,000 (1-0.33)(1-0.0)/
(1-0.20)]. Under this system, the tax-
exempt stockholders receive tax credit
from the U.K. government.
Basic-rate shareholders would re-
ceive net dividend income of £670.
[=£1,000 (1-0.33)(1-0.20)/(1-0.20)]. In
this system, the basic-rate sharehold-
ers will pay the same tax because the
ACT or rate of imputation (s = 20%) is
set equal to the basic rate of tax on
dividend income (m = 20%); thus the
additional tax liability or refund equals
zero.
If the stockholders are higher-rate
taxpayers (m > s), more taxes will be
levied because the tax credit will not
completely satisfy their income tax
liability. The additional tax liability is
equal to (m – s) D. In 1996, the top rate
taxpayers (m = 40%) paid an addi-
tional tax liability of £167.5 [(40% -
20%) £837.5] to the Inland Revenue
Service. Accordingly, the top rate tax-
payers received the net dividend in-
come of £502.5 [=(£670-£167.5) or =
(£1,000)(1-0.33)(1-0.40)/(1-0.20)].
If we compare the dividend in-
comes under the two tax regimes in
Table 2, it can be summarized that the
dividend income under the imputation
system is greater than that under the
classical system. The rationale behind
this fact is that the distributed profits
(dividends) under the classical system
are subject to double taxation (corpo-
ration tax and income tax), whereas the
imputation system provides sharehold-
ers with credit for tax paid by the
company, and this credit can be used to
reduce their income tax liability on
dividends. Under the imputation sys-
tem, part of the firm’s tax liability is
imputed to the shareholders and re-
garded as a prepayment of their in-
come tax on dividends.
Under the imputation tax system,
different types of stockholders may
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have different tax preferences against
and for dividends. The stockholders
may receive capital gains if the com-
pany does not pay out dividends. If
capital gain tax rate is z, and stockhold-
ers receive capital gains of £1, then the
after-tax amount received will be (1-
z). In this situation, stockholders pre-
fer dividends only if the value of after-
tax dividends is greater than the value
of after-tax capital gains; that is {(1-
m)/(1-s)}> (1- z) . On the contrary,
capital gains will be preferred to divi-
dends if: (1 – z) > {(1 – m) / (1 – s)}.
(Chui et al. 1992).
Since July 1997, pension provid-
ers and most of the U.K. corporate
shareholders (including authorized unit
trusts) have no longer been entitled to
the payment of related tax credit.
Hence, the incentive to receive divi-
dends for tax-exempt shareholders has
declined significantly. In the budget
speech on July 2, 1997, Mr. Gordon
Brown, the Chancellor of the Exche-
quer, said:
The present system of tax-credits
encourages companies to pay out
dividends rather than reinvest their
profits. This cannot be the best way
of encouraging investment for the
long term as was acknowledged by
the last government. Many pension
funds are in substantial surplus and
at present many companies are en-
joying pension holidays, so this is
the right time to undertake long-
needed reform. So, with immediate
effect, I propose to abolish tax cred-
its paid to pension funds and
companies.[Budget Statement 1997.
HANSARD- Parliamentary Debate,
House of Commons Official Report
297 (33): 306.
Historically, pension funds, which
are tax-exempt, could receive a refund
(tax credit) on their dividend income.
The tax credit given to pension funds
reduces overall tax revenues of the
U.K. government. If the dividend had
not been paid, the tax revenues would
have been higher. Therefore, this pay-
ment to pension funds represents not
only a tax exemption, but also a partial
refund of corporation tax. The imputa-
tion system provides the pension funds
and other tax-exempt shareholders with
tax advantage which may contribute to
the increase of dividend payment.
If a dividend is paid on or after
July 2, 1997, pension providers and
most the U.K. corporate shareholders
(including authorized unit trusts) will
no longer be entitled to payment of
related tax credit. The U.K. govern-
ment also eliminated the ACT refund
for other zero-rate taxpayers starting
in 1999. However, tax credit would
continue to be payable to charities and
some other tax-exempt institutions until
1999 when they were gradually elimi-
nated over a period of five years. An-
other government’s proposal would
reduce the tax credit rate from 20 per-
cent to 10 percent in 1999. At the same
time, the government has proposed to
decrease the corporate tax rate from 33
percent to 31 percent.
Table 3 shows the effective rate of
income tax received by shareholders
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under the imputation tax system be-
fore and after the 1997 abolition of tax
credit on dividends. Table 4 (a) and 4
(b) provide examples of the calcula-
tion for the effective rate before and
after the abolition of tax credit. Sup-
pose a shareholder receives net divi-
dends (d) of £100 and the rate of impu-
tation (s) is 20 percent, then the gross
dividends (D) would be £125 [= £100/
(1–20%)]. If the stockholder is tax
exempt (m = 0), she will receive tax
credit from the U.K. government, and
the tax refund will be equal to £25.
Before the abolition of tax credit, she
would receive total dividends of £125
(£25 + £100). The effective rate for the
tax-exempt shareholder would be (–)
25 percent. However, after the 1997
abolition of tax credit, she is no longer
entitled to the payment of tax credit,
and the effective rate of income tax
increases to 0 percent and she will only
receive dividends of £100. Therefore,
the amount of dividends received by
tax-exempt shareholders (pension
funds) declines significantly from £125
to £100 after the abolition of the tax
credit.
If the stockholders are top-rate
taxpayers, more taxes will be levied
since the tax credit will not completely
satisfy their income tax liability. The
additional tax liability will be equal to
(m – s) D = (40% –20%) £125 = £25.
Hence, before the abolition of tax credit,
the effective rate of income tax was 25
percent (=£25/ £100). After the aboli-
tion, the effective rate of top-rate share-
holders remains unchanged.
If the stockholder is a basic-rate
taxpayer, the rate of ACT is set equal to
the basic rate of tax on dividend in-
come or (m = s), thus the additional tax
liability or refund equals zero. Before
and after the 1997 abolition of tax
credit on dividends, the effective rate
of dividend income for the basic-rate
shareholders remains the same (0%).
In the U.K., capital gains are taxed
at income tax rate. However, the effec-
tive rate on capital gains is likely to be
Table 3.Effective Rate of Income Tax Before and After the 1997 Abolition of
Tax Credit on Dividend
Effective Rates of Income Tax
Before the Abolition of After the Abolition of
Tax Credit Tax Credit
Shareholders Dividend Capital Dividend Capital
Income Tax Gain Tax Income Tax Gain Tax
Tax-exempt -25% 0% 0% 0%
Basic rate 0% 23% 0% 23%
Top rate 25% 40% 25% 40%
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Table 4 (a).Effective Rate of Dividend Income Tax Before the 1997 Abolition
of Tax Credit
Effective Rate of Dividend Income Tax Before the Abolition
Tax Exempt Basic Rate Top Rate
m = 0% m = 20% m = 40%
Net Dividend=d =£100 £100 £100 £100
Gross Div : D=d/(1-s) £125 £125 £125
Tax Credit = s 20% = £25 20% = £25 20% = £25
Statutory Rate =SR 0% x Gross 20% x Gross 40% x Gross
(SR=m x D ) Dividend= £0 Dividend= £25 Dividend= £50
Additional Tax Liability Refund from Additional Tax Additional Tax
or Refund ATL= Inland Revenue Payment Payment
(SR – Tax Credit) = –£25 =£ 0 =£ 25
Dividends Received
by Shareholders= £125 £100 £75
(d– SR +s)
Thus, Effective
Tax Rate = ATL / d –-25% 0% 25%
Table 4 (b). Effective Rate of Dividend Income Tax After the1997 Abolition of
Tax Credit
Effective Rate of Dividend Income Tax After the Abolition
Tax Exempt Basic Rate Top Rate
m = 0% m = 20% m = 40%
Net Dividend=d =£100 £100 £100 £100
Gross Div : D=d/(1-s) £125 £125 £125
Tax Credit =s 0% =£ 0 20% =£25 20% = £25
Statutory Rate =SR 0% x Gross 20% x Gross 40% x Gross
(SR =m x D ) Dividend= £0 Dividend= £25 Dividend= £50
Additional Tax Liability or Refund from Additional Tax Additional Tax
ATL= Inland Revenue Payment Payment
(SR – Tax Credit) = £ 0 =£ 0 =£ 25
Dividends Received by
Shareholders= £100 £100 £75
(d– SR +s)
Thus, Effective Tax Rate=
ATL / d 0% 0% 25%
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significantly lower than the income
tax rate as the capital gains are taxed
only on realization, thereby reaping
the benefits of payment deferral, vari-
ous allowances, and indexation (Lasfer
1995). For instance, in 1999, each of a
husband and wife ‘living together’ has
the benefit of annual capital gains ex-
emption of £7,100 when shares are
sold. A shareholder is also entitled to
an indexation allowance, which pro-
vides protection from the effect of in-
flation.
Suppose the effective rate of capi-
tal gains tax for top-rate shareholders
is 20 percent (see Table 3: Capital
gains tax 40%) and if the stockhold-
ers receive capital gains of £100, then
the after-tax capital gains will be £80
[= £100 (1–20%)]. In this case, the top-
rate stockholders will prefer capital
gains since the value of after-tax capi-
tal gains (£80) is greater than the value
of after-tax dividends (£75; effective
rate of dividend income = 25%).
As can be seen from Table 3, 4(a)
and 4(b), the 1997 Abolition of Tax
Credit has decreased the attractiveness
of dividend income relative to capital
gains for the group of shareholders
whose dividend income is not taxed
(tax-exempt security holders). These
shareholders, such as pension funds,
experience a sharp increase in their
effective tax rate on dividends from -
25 percent in the period before the
abolition of tax credit to zero percent
following the new tax regulation. Ac-
cordingly, this tax regulation may in-
duce these shareholders to shift their
preference for dividends towards capi-
tal gains. This change in the effective
taxation of capital gains and dividends
at the level of the security holders may
finally affect corporate dividend policy.
Research Objective
The study of corporate dividend
policy under market imperfection has
long been the subject of theoretical and
empirical research. Any change in an
imperfection may lead to a shift in the
market equilibrium, and this provides
an opportunity to examine equilibrium
theories. One such event is the 1997
abolition of tax credit on dividends,
the major change in the tax position of
the U.K. companies (pension funds).
The abolition of the tax credit on divi-
dends will remove a distortion in the
tax system which encourages the dis-
tribution of earnings as dividends rather
than their retention. A high dividend
payout may reduce the availability of
low-cost internal source of fund, and
this could decrease the level of invest-
ment expenditures. Hence, the U.K.
government attempts to harness the
tax system to encourage lower divi-
dends and larger reinvestment.
The traditional differential taxa-
tion of capital gains and dividends has
generated a controversy with regard to
the valuation of firm equity and the
setting of dividend policy.
The 1997 abolition of tax credit
on dividends provides an opportunity
to test whether tax affects corporate
dividend policy. If a company’s man-
agement perceives investors to have a
tax-induced preference that may influ-
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ence the valuation of equity, then
changes in the effective taxation of
capital gains and dividends should af-
fect the corporate dividend policy. This
study tests the prediction that the abo-
lition of tax credit on dividends is
followed by a decrease in the aggre-
gate dividend payment in the post-
abolition period.
Through the abolition of tax credit
paid to pension funds and companies,
combined with a decrease in the corpo-
rate tax burden from 33 percent to 31
percent in 1997, the U.K. government
attempts to utilize a tax system to en-
courage lower dividends and greater
reinvestment. The 1997 abolition of
tax credit on dividends presents a
changing tax scenario in which theo-
ries of dividend can be examined em-
pirically.
The objective of this study is to
determine whether the aggregate divi-
dend payment changes as a result of
the 1997 abolition of tax credit on
dividends. Tax-clientele theories sug-
gest that the tax penalty on dividends
suppresses the aggregate dividend pay-
ment. This study tests whether corpo-
rate dividend policy is set to suit the tax
clientele by looking at the effect of the
1997 abolition of tax credit on aggre-
gate dividend payment.
Literature Review
Following the study of Miller and
Modigliani (1961) which demonstrates
the dividend irrelevance in the perfect
capital markets, numerous studies have
been conducted to explain the divi-
dend payment in the light of market
imperfections in the form of taxation.
Miller and Modigliani argue that the
value of the firm is determined by its
earnings power and risk, and thus the
firm’s value depends on its investment
policy rather than the proportion of
earnings distributed as dividends. This
review focuses on the literature rel-
evant to this empirical study: (1) be-
havioral model of dividend policy and
(2) theories and evidence of the tax
clientele dividend equilibrium.
The Behavioral Model of
Dividend Policy
Corporate dividend policy in-
volves the decision to pay out profits
versus retaining them for reinvestment
in the company. There are a number of
factors that may influence a firm’s
dividend policy, including the profit
level, the stability of earnings, the vol-
ume of good investment opportunities
available, the tax position of share-
holders, and legal considerations.
In 1956, Lintner conducted inter-
views with 28 companies to investi-
gate their thoughts on the determina-
tion of dividend policy. His study sug-
gests that corporate managers focus on
the change in the existing rate of divi-
dend payout, not on the amount of the
newly established payout as such. Most
companies seek to avoid making
changes in their dividend rates that
may have to be reversed within a year
or so. Generally, investment require-
ments have little effect on modifying
the pattern of dividend behavior. More-
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over, major changes in earnings which
are ‘out of line’ with the existing divi-
dend rate are the most important deter-
minants of a firm’s dividend decision.
In his study, companies tended to
make periodic partial adjustments to-
wards a target dividend payout ratio
rather than dramatic changes in payout
since corporate managers believed that
stockholders preferred a steady stream
of dividends. Lintner’s study suggests
that two parameters describe dividend
policy: (1) the target dividend payout
ratio and (2) the speed of adjustment of
current dividends to the target divi-
dends. His model of corporate divi-
dend policy is as follows:
D
t
 - D
t-1
= a + s(E
t
 - D
t-1
) + u
t
 ......(1)
where:D
t
= current dividends,
D
t-1
= lagged dividends,
a = constant,
E
t
= current earnings,
s = speed of adjustment co-
efficient,
r = target dividend payout
ratio, and
u
t
= unexplained error term.
In this model, dividends are as-
sumed to be based on earnings after
tax, and are assumed to be adjusted
slowly to a change in earnings. Com-
panies are perceived as pursuing a tar-
get dividend payout ratio (r), which is
applied to current earnings (E
t
). If divi-
dends are fully adjusted each year to
achieve the target payout level (r E
t
),
they will change by (rE
t
 – D
t-1
), be-
tween period t and t-1. A conservative
company will have a low adjustment
rate while a less conservative com-
pany will have a high adjustment rate,
captured in the speed of adjustment
coefficient (s). For instance, if the speed
of adjustment, s = 0, and constant term
a = 0, so D
t-1 
= D
t
; whereas if s = 1 and
a = 0, the actual change in dividends
will be equal to the target change in
dividends. The constant term a is added
to allow for company’s reluctance to
cut dividends. If a is positive, Lintner’s
model shows that dividends will be
inclined to move upward even if none
of the other terms changes. Hence,
current dividends (D
t
) must be below
D
t-1 
to offset the constant for a cut in
dividends to be indicated.
Fama and Babiak (1968) reevalu-
ated Lintner’s model, and find that the
partial-adjustment model proposed by
Lintner continues to perform well rela-
tive to alternative specifications using
both economywide earnings and divi-
dend data. Several inter-temporal divi-
dend models were tested in their study.
For example, they examined a model
involving additional lagged values,
either or both of the earnings and divi-
dend variables, and the estimating equa-
tion is:
D
i,t
 - D
i,t-1
 =
i
 + 
1.i1
D
i,t-1
 + 
2i
D
i,t-2
+ 
3i
E
t,t 
+ 
4i
E
t,t-1
 + u
i,t
.................................................(2)
This regression model was applied to
each of the 392 companies (time series
data from 1947 to 1964). The results
show that adding the lagged dividend
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D
t-2 
does not improve upon the expla-
nation of annual dividend changes pro-
vided by the Lintner’s model. The mean
and median values of adjusted R-square
for the two models are almost identi-
cal. For the lagged earnings variable
E
t-1
, the results seem to indicate that
lagged earnings do not have signifi-
cant explanatory power, presumably
due to multicollinearity between E
t
and
 
E
t-1
. The statistical results show
that t-value of the coefficient of E
t
declines substantially when E
t-1
 is in-
corporated into the model.
Finally, Fama and Babiak con-
clude:
The regressions on the firm data,
the simulations, and the prediction
tests provide consistent evidence on
dividend models for individual firms.
The two-variable Lintner model,
including a constant term, D
t-1 
and
E
t
, performs well relative to other
models; in general, however, delet-
ing the constant and adding the
lagged profits variable E
t-1
 leads to
slight improvement in the predictive
power of the model. In applying
dividend models to the data of most
firms, net income seems to provide a
better measure of profits than either
cash flow or net income and depre-
ciation included as separate vari-
ables in the model. Finally, in the
model tested here, serial dependence
in disturbances does not seem to be
a serious problem (p. 1160).
Theobald (1978) conducted an
empirical study on the dividend be-
havior using the U.K. data, and the
following three intertemporal dividend
models were tested:
model 1 : D
t
 - D
t-1
=  + 
1
E
t
 +

2
D
t-1
 + u
t
...................................(3)
model 2 : D
t
 - D
t-1
=  + 
1
E
t
 +

2
D
t-1
 + 
3
D
t-2
+ u
t
...................................(4)
model 3 : D
t
 - D
t-1
=  + 
1
E
t
 +

2
D
t-1
 + 
4
E
t-1
+ u
t
...................................(5)
where: = constant,
D
t
= current dividends,
D
t-1
= one-period lagged divi-
dends,
E
t
= current earnings,
E
t-1
= one-period lagged earn-
ings and
u
t  
= error term.
These three models were applied
to each of the 41 the U.K. companies
for the period of 1964-1975 (12 years).
The regression results show that in the
model 1, the mean parameter estimates
for constant (), current earnings (E
t
)
and one-period lagged dividends (D
t-1
)
coefficients have high t-values. In the
model 2, the two-period lagged divi-
dends variable (D
t-2
), on average, would
not appear to improve the explanatory
power of Lintner’s model significantly
(model 1). Furthermore, the mean t-
value of 
3 
 is low and the mean t-value
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of 
2 
declines in the model 2. This
reduction of the t-values for the one-
period lagged dividends variable (D
t-1
)
indicates that additional multicollinear-
ity is present in this model since the
two lagged dividends variables (D
t-1
and D
t-2 
) are incorporated in this equa-
tion.
However, model 3 has a mean of
R-square which is substantially higher
than that of model 1. Again, an addi-
tional multicollinearity is confirmed
by reducing the t-values for the current
earnings (E
t
) and lagged dividends
variables (D
t-1
) after introducing one-
period lagged earnings into the model
3. A multicollinearity is almost preva-
lent in time-series data, and since E
j,t
and E
j,t-1
 are correlated, this would in-
crease the standard errors of the pa-
rameter estimates, thereby reducing
the t-values.
Theobald finally concludes that
the most important result of the study
has been its confirmation of the ex-
pected instability and disorientation
introduced from 1973 onwards in the
firm dividend decision by inflation,
dividend restraint and introduction of
Advanced Corporation Tax. The time
series work (Section IV a) provided
relatively strong insights into the
intertemporal dividend behavior of
firms for the period 1964 to 1974. This
result is somewhat surprising in view
of the structural changes present in the
latter two periods of the sample. The
structural changes could cause the dis-
turbance term to have a nonzero ex-
pected value with the result that the
parameter estimates would be biased,
but there does not appear to be a clear
cut reason why such well defined pa-
rameters, in terms of t-statistics, should
have been obtained. (p.134)
Following the spirit of Lintner’s
study, Baker et al. (1985) conducted a
survey of management views on divi-
dend policy. They delivered question-
naires to chief financial officers of 562
companies listed on the New York
Stock Exchange representing three in-
dustry groups: (1) electric utility, (2)
manufacturing, and (3) wholesale/re-
tail. The first objective of their study
was to examine how well Lintner’s
model described current practice. The
respondents were asked to indicate the
importance of each of 15 factors in
determining their companies’ actual
dividend policy. The findings docu-
ment that the same four determinants
are considered the most important by
the three groups. The most highly
ranked determinants are the anticipated
level of a company’s future earnings
and the pattern of past dividends. The
high ranking of these two factors is
consistent with Lintner’s results.
The third important factor in de-
termining dividend policy is cash avail-
ability. Lintner did not directly men-
tion this determinant. However, Van
Horne (1983) and Brigham and
Gapenski (1987) note that the level of
cash holding is an important determi-
nant for managerial dividend choices.
The fourth major determinant is con-
cerned about maintaining or increas-
ing share price. This is particularly
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strong among utility companies that
rank this factor the second in impor-
tance.
Moreover, they observe signifi-
cantly different attitudes towards cor-
porate dividend policy among the three
industry groups. The differences occur
primarily as a result of the responses of
utility managers. They conclude that
these differences may be due to regu-
lations. For instance, since regulations
provide utilities with monopoly power
over a product which enjoys steady
demand, their earnings are relatively
stable. Therefore, their risk of reduc-
ing dividends owing to an unexpected
decline in earnings is less than that of
other companies.
According to Baker et al. (1985),
regulation per se makes the behavior
of managers in this group different
from that of other groups. Regulation
leads corporate managers to be more
concerned with maintaining or increas-
ing share price, with maintaining tar-
get capital structure, and with the cost
of raising external funds. On the other
hand, corporate managers are less con-
cerned with the availability of profit-
able investment opportunities for the
company, and with projections con-
cerning the future state of the economy.
Hence, it is plausible that the dividend
policy of regulated companies differs
from that of non-regulated companies.
Benito and Young (2003) con-
ducted a study on dividend omissions
and dividend cuts by British compa-
nies to answer a question on what
financial situations determine whether
a firm pays a dividend or not. They
used probit model to examine the rela-
tionship between probability of a divi-
dend omission or a dividend cut and
the financial characteristics such as
cash flow level, leverage, investment
opportunities, actual investment, and
real sales. Companies with a high level
of cash flows are less likely to cut
dividends while high level of leverage
increases the probability. A high level
of investment is negatively related to
the probability of cutting dividend pay-
ment; companies undertaking a high
level of investments are quite confi-
dent about their future prospects and
thereby less likely to cut/omit the divi-
dends.
Using total sample of 2,963 com-
panies during the period of 1974-1999,
they identify an increase in proportion
of the U.K. companies that omitted
dividend payment from 1995, and this
increase is largely accounted for by an
increase in the proportion of compa-
nies that have never paid dividends.
Benito and Young (2003) find that
most of firms that have never paid
dividends are relatively small firms
with strong investment opportunities,
and an increase in dividend omissions
does not reflect balance sheet weak-
ness. This change reflects “great ex-
pectation” rather than “hard times.”
They also find that there is little evi-
dence to link the increase in omission
to the major tax reform of 1997 that
abolishes dividend tax credit to tax-
exempt investors.
Furthermore, Benito and Young
(2003) argue that the low level of cash
flows, greater opportunities for invest-
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ments, and the high level of leverage
are all associated with an increased
propensity to omit dividends. In par-
ticular, those of cash flows and lever-
age are more strongly related to the
propensity to cut dividends. This situ-
ation suggests that a dividend cut is a
stronger indicator of financial fragility
than dividend omission.
The Tax Clientele Theories and
Evidence
The concept of dividend clientele
was originally suggested by Miller and
Modigliani  (1961):
If for example the frequency dis-
tribution of corporate payout ratios
happened to correspond exactly with
the distribution of investor prefer-
ences for payout ratios, then the
existence of these preferences would
clearly lead ultimately to a situation
whose implications were different,
in no fundamental respect, from the
perfect market case. Each corpora-
tion would tend to attract to itself a
“clientele” consisting of those pre-
ferring its particular payout ratio,
but one clientele would be entirely
as good as another in terms of the
valuation it would imply for the firm
(page 431).
The problem brought to light by
Miller and Modigliani rests in the dif-
ferent tax rates applied to dividend
income and capital gains. One way to
analyze this problem is to compare two
companies (for instance, X Ltd. and Y
Ltd.) identical in all aspects except that
X Ltd. pays dividends and Y Ltd. does
not pay dividends. In this context, the
pre-tax one-year holding period re-
turns for the two companies must be
identical:
R
x
 = R
y
,
and
where:
P 
y, t +1  
=share price in the year end
for company Y
P 
y, t
= share price at the beginning
of the year for company Y
P 
x, t + 1
= share price in the year end
for company X
P 
x, t
= share price at the beginning
of the year for company X
D 
x 
/ P
x, t
= dividend yield for company
X
If different tax rates are applied to
dividend income and capital gains, the
after-tax returns would be:
and
R
y
=                       .................... (7)
P
y,t+1
 - P
y,t
P
y,t
( )
R
x
=             +                       .....(6)( DxP
x,t
) Px,t + 1 - Px,tP
x,t
( )
P
x,t
 
+ 1
 - P
x,t
P
x,t
( )(1-tg) ....(8)
R
x, after - tax
=            (1-t
p
) +( Dx
P
x,t
)
R
y, after - tax
=
P
y,t
 
+ 1
 - P
y,t
P
y,t
( )(1-tg) ....(9)
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where: t
g 
= capital gains tax
t
p 
= dividend income tax
In the aforementioned condition,
the after-tax returns of the two compa-
nies are only equal when t
g
= t
p
. If t
p
> t
g
,
then the after-tax return on company Y
is greater than that on company X, vice
versa. A solution to this apparent prob-
lem was suggested by Miller and
Modigliani (1961) that the tax clien-
tele exists and that non-dividend-pay-
ing stocks are held by stockholders
with t
p
> t
g 
while dividend-paying stocks
are held by stockholders with t
p
< t
g
.
This situation is commonly referred to
as the tax-clientele hypothesis.
Different clienteles (groups) of
stockholders prefer different dividend
policy. For instance, stockholders such
as retired individuals or pension funds
often prefer dividend (current) income,
thus they want the company to pay
higher percentage of its earnings. Such
stockholders are often in low or even
zero income-tax bracket. Other share-
holders prefer reinvestment since they
have no need for current investment
income.
The traditional view of tax-clien-
tele theory holds that under tax disad-
vantage for dividends and full infor-
mation, the dividend payment (divi-
dend demand) is irrational. Probably a
wealth-maximizing stockholder would
prefer capital gains due to lower tax
rate. Accordingly, a preference for divi-
dends is not consistent with the as-
sumption of utility maximization. Sev-
eral studies have suggested alternative
models under which this would not be
the case. Shefrin and Statman (1984),
for instance, argue that shareholders,
rather than maximizing a utility func-
tion, maximize a value function that
places a higher value on consistent
dividend income than on capital gains.
In their paper, Shefrin and Statman
provide a psychological description of
an individual shareholder’s preference
for cash dividends. They suggest vari-
ous reasons for dividend payment. For
instance, due to the lack of self-con-
trol, the individual shareholder finds a
difficulty delaying consumption, so
she wishes to impose constraints on
her actions (as a rule). A shareholder
who desires to conserve her wealth
should not consume capital; she only
consumes dividends. If this rule is es-
tablished, consuming dividends be-
comes a standard procedure. Dividend
payment of companies can be selected
to conform to her consumption level.
Even though tax may favor capital
gains, shareholders may find cash divi-
dends attractive, and thus they want to
pay the appropriate premium.
Miller and Modigliani (1961) sug-
gest that the aggregate dividend pay-
ment satisfies tax clienteles who prefer
either capital gains or dividend in-
come. The aggregate dividend pay-
ment serves to satisfy these tax clien-
teles. Predicated on this line of reason-
ing, Farrar and Selwyn (1967) and
Brenan (1970) develop equilibrium
models in which dividends exist to
satisfy the tax clienteles. This study
refers these models to as tax-clientele
models.
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Farrar and Selwyn assume that
individuals attempt to maximize their
after-tax income. Stockholders have
two alternatives: (1) they can buy shares
in a levered company, or (2) they can
own stocks in an all-equity company
and borrow in order to give personal
leverage. The first alternative is the
form of payment to be made by the
company. The company can pay out
earnings as dividends or allow stock-
holders to take their income in the form
of capital gains. Stockholders must
choose whether they want capital gains
or dividends. The second alternative is
the amount of corporate versus per-
sonal level of gearing that is desired.
If the company pays out all of its
earnings as dividends, the stockhold-
ers will receive Y
id
.
Y
id
={(CF - rD
c
)(1 - t
c
) - rD
ip
}(1- t
ip
)
...........................................(10)
where:Y 
i d
= after-tax income to the
ith shareholder if earn-
ings are received as divi-
dends.
 CF = company’s cash flows
from operations
   r = interest rate (borrowing
rate) which is assumed
to be equal for  compa-
nies and individuals
D
c
= company’s debt
D
i p
= individual debt
t
i p
= personal income tax rate
t
c
= corporate tax rate
In the above equation, all of
company’s after-tax earnings, (CF – r
D
c
 )(1– t
c
), are assumed to be paid out
as dividends. Income (before tax) re-
ceived by stockholders is the dividends
minus the interest on liability used to
buy stocks.
Another alternative is the com-
pany can decide to pay no dividend. In
this case, it is assumed that all gains are
realized immediately by stockholders
and taxed at capital gains rate. After-
tax income received by a stockholder
is as follows:
Y
ig
 = {(CF - rD
c
)(1 - t
c
)(1- t
g
)}-
rD
ip
(1-t
ip
) ...................... (11)
where:Y
i g
= after-tax income to the
shareholder if earnings
are received as capital
gains
t
g
= capital gains tax rate
In this situation, a shareholder pays
capital gains tax on income from the
company and subtracts after-tax inter-
est expenses on personal liability. The
company can translate cash flows into
capital gains by repurchasing its stocks
in the market. From the two equations
above, the ratio of capital gains (Y
ig
)
and dividend income (Y
id
 ) is as fol-
lows:
.............................................(12)
)t}(1rD)t)(1rD{(CF
)t(1rD)}t)(1trDc)(1{(CF
Y
Y
ipipcc
ipipgc
id
ig



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If the tax rate on capital gains is
less than the personal income tax (t
g
 <
t
ip
), shareholders will prefer capital
gains to dividend income for any posi-
tive operating cash flows or earnings.
Thus, the ratio of the two income
streams is greater than one if t
g
 < t
ip
. In
general, the best form of payment is
the one that is subject to the least tax
rate.
Farrar and Selwyn also discuss an
issue of debt policy. The debt should
be held by the party who has the high-
est marginal tax rate such that the great-
est tax shield can be acquired from the
deductible interest payment. In the
environment where only corporate in-
come is taxed, all debts should be held
by a corporation. In the situation where
both corporate income and personal
income are taxed, and corporate in-
come may be subject to effective taxa-
tion as capital gains: t
g
 < t
ip
, all debts
should be held by individuals.
If all earnings are paid out as divi-
dends, the favorable tax treatment of
capital gains is not relevant. In this
case, the value of the company can be
maximized by taking on maximum
level of debt. This can be proved by
taking the partial derivative of the fol-
lowing equation:
Y
id
 = {(CF-rD
c
)(1-t
c
) - rD
ip
}.(1-t
ip
)
By differentiating the equation
with respect to personal debt (D
ip
) and
corporate debt (D
c
), we obtain:
  Personal debt :
      ..............................................(13)
  Corporate debt:
From the results of the partial de-
rivatives above, corporate debt is al-
ways cheaper than personal debt. A
company can exploit its superior bor-
rowing opportunities to get an access
to a cheap source of funds.
If a company decides to pay no
dividend, and all earnings are trans-
lated into capital gains, then the above
generality disappears. By differentiat-
ing the following equation with re-
spect to personal and corporate debt,
we can obtain:
Personal debt:                          ...(16)
 Corporate debt:
The relative value of corporate tax
and personal tax shields depends on
the array of marginal tax rates, t
g
, t
ip
,
and t
c.
 faced by individual sharehold-
ers. If capital gains tax is zero (t
g
 = 0),
then personal debt will be preferred to
corporate debt by shareholders who
are in marginal tax brackets higher
than the marginal tax of the company.
Y
id
D
ip
= -r.(1-t
ip
)
Y
id
D
c
=
-r(1-t
c
)(1-t
p
)....(14)
Y
ig
= {(CF-rD
c
)(1-t
c
)(1-t
g
)}- rD
ip
(1-t
ip
)....(15)
Y
id
D
ip
= -r(1-tp)
-r(1-t
c
)(1-t
g
)....(17)
=
Y
id
D
c
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Brennan (1970) extends the study
of Farrar and Selwyn into a general
equilibrium model where sharehold-
ers or investors are assumed to maxi-
mize their expected utility of wealth.
His conclusion on dividend payout is:
“for a given level of risk, investors
require a higher total return on a secu-
rity the higher its prospective dividend
yield is, because of the higher rate of
tax levied on dividends than on capital
gains.” This statement suggests that
dividend payout should be included as
the second factor in the CAPM (Capi-
tal Asset Pricing Model) to explain the
equilibrium rate of return on securi-
ties. The equilibrium relationship is
given by:
where R
i
 is the before-tax rate of return
on security i, b is systematic risk, DY
i
is dividend yield on security i, and R
f 
is
the risk-free rate. The model is derived
under the assumption of unrestricted
short sales and unlimited lending and
borrowing at the risk-free rate.
Empirical investigation on the tax-
clientele theory can be classified into
three main groups. The first group of
the empirical tests has focused on the
behavior of dividend-paying shares
using the Capital Asset Pricing Model
incorporating a dividend coefficient.
The second group has examined the
implied tax rate reflected in the ex-
dividend day price behavior while the
third group has studied the aggregate
dividend payment following a change
in the capital gains tax relative to the
dividend income tax rate.
This study is focused on the third
group which is relevant to this empiri-
cal research. Poterba (1987) conducted
a study to test whether dividend pay-
out policy responds to a change in the
relative tax burden on capital gains and
dividends in U.S. market. He finds that
an increase in the capital gains tax rate
relative to the dividend tax rate results
in an increase in the aggregate divi-
dend payment.
His model is based on the partial-
adjustment framework proposed by
Lintner (1956). His analysis is focused
on the logarithm of aggregate real divi-
dends, and the target dividend level
(D*) is assumed to be a constant-elas-
ticity function of equity earnings (E).
The after-tax income is associated with
one dollar of dividend payout relative
to one dollar of corporate retention
with resulting capital gains . The
estimating equation is as follows:
ln(D*) = 
0 
+ 
1 
ln (E) +

2 
ln ()..........(18)
His model for the annual percentage
change in real dividends is obtained by
combining this steady-state specifica-
tion with flexible short-term dynam-
ics, and the equation is:
Δ ln(D
 t
) = 
0 
+ 
1 
 ln (E
 t
) +

2 
 ln (
t
) +

3 
[ln (D
t-1
) –
ln (D*
t-1
)] + 
 t
E(R
i
 - R
f
)= 
0
 + 
1
 (DY
i
 - R
f
)
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In this model , the dependent vari-
able , ln(D
 t
), is the logarithmic change
in real dividend payment by domestic
companies. Some different measures
of earnings (E
 t
) are utilized to explain
the target dividends, for instance after-
tax company profits (unadjusted earn-
ings) and earnings adjusted for inven-
tory valuation.
The ratio of after-tax income or
tax preference parameter (
t
) is a
weighted average across stockholders
of the after-tax income associated with
corporate dividend payout, divided by
the after-tax income associated with
undistributed profits:
where, S = number of distinct share-
holder classes
m
it
= marginal dividend tax rate
on shareholders in class i

it
= tax rate on undistributed
profits
z
it
= accrual-equivalent capital
gains tax rate
Poterba’s findings indicate the
importance of tax policy for corporate
dividend payout. The estimated tax
effects are statistically significant and
similar across various specifications;
one percent increase in the ratio of
after-tax dividend income to after-tax
capital gains income (
t
) results in an
increase in the real dividends (D
t
) about
0.66 percent in short term. In addition,
the long-term effect of such a dividend
tax decrease is a two percent to three
percent dividend payout increase.
His results also show that the 1986
Tax Reform Act in the U.S. lowered
marginal dividend tax rates for most
shareholders while increasing the tax
burden on capital gains, and these
changes have encouraged companies
to increase the dividend payout ratio.
Feldstein (1970) conducted re-
search to examine whether dividend
payout policy responds to a change in
the tax incentive during the period
from 1953 to 1964 in the U.K. market.
The dividend equations estimated in
his study are the generalization of
Lintner’s model (1956). His model
assumes that optimum dividends (D
t
)
reflect the company’s level of earnings
(E
t
), the tax-determined opportunity
cost of one pound of retained earnings
in terms of the forgone net dividends
(
t
), and disturbance terms.
The dividend equation is given:
lnD
t 
- lnD
t-1
=  +  lnE
t 
+
b ln
t 
- lnD 
t-1 
+
w
t 
.................... (20)
where  is a response elasticity ap-
proximated by the partial adjustment
model.
His results show that the differen-
tial profit tax has a substantial impact
on dividend level. Changes in tax rate
affect both the ratio of maximum net
profits to gross profits and the opportu-
nity cost of retained earnings in terms
of forgone dividends. Dividends re-
spond to these changes with the dis-
tributed lag; between 40 percent and

t
= wit .......(19)
(1 - m
it
)
(1 - z
it
)(1 - 
it
)
s
t=1
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60 percent of the ultimate effect occur
in the first year.
Khoury and Smith (1977) con-
ducted a study to observe how the
dividend policies of Canadian compa-
nies were affected by a change in tax
structure –the imposition of capital
gains tax in Canada in January 1972.
Their results are consistent with the
thesis that the aggregate supply of divi-
dends is sensitive to the differential
between capital gains and ordinary
income taxes. They utilized the partial
adjustment dividend model of Lintner
(1956) to obtain a dividend forecast for
Canadian firms. The hypothesis that
dividend policies of Canadian firms do
not change after the introduction of the
capital gains tax is rejected. Canadian
companies significantly increase their
dividend payout after the introduction
of capital gains tax for the first time in
1972. The average percentage divi-
dend change doubled from 5 percent
during the prior years (1963-1971) to
10.1 percent in the subsequent two
years (1972-1973).
Sample and Data
In this study, sample is comprised
of 121 U.K. companies drawn from the
Datastream International (FT All
Shares). These companies are derived
from 20 industry groups, and for a
company to be included in this sample,
it has to satisfy the following criteria:
first, it did not file for bankruptcy
during the period of 1974-1999, and
second, the requisite data, which are
cash dividends and earnings, of each
company are available for the whole
period of 1974-1999.
Annual cash dividends and earn-
ings were collected for each company.
Dividends and earnings were then ad-
justed for stock splits and stock divi-
dends. Dividend payout ratios were
calculated from annual dividends and
earnings per share. In those years for
which companies had negative earn-
ings, the companies’ dividend payout
ratios could not be computed. Of the
129 companies in the original sample,
8 companies were excluded due to
negative earnings or zero dividends.
Hence, the number of companies in
this study is 121 companies, and these
companies come from 20 industry
groups (sectors).
To show a preliminary view of the
time-series behavior of pertinent vari-
ables in this study, Figure 1 and Figure
2 graphically present dividend pay-
ment, earnings after tax, and dividend
payout ratios (dividend payment as a
proportion of earnings after tax) for the
U.K. companies (121 sample firms)
over the period of 1974-1999 (see
Appendix 1 as well).
As can be seen from these exhib-
its, the dividend payment of the U.K.
firms was low following the imposi-
tion of dividend control during the
period from 1973 to 1979. During this
period, companies were permitted to
increase dividends by a percentage of
the previous year’s dividends. The
permitted percentage went from 5 per-
cent to 12.5 percent and back to 10
percent during the period. The intro-
duction of dividend control as part of
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the income policy reduced the divi-
dend payment by 20 percent (Bank of
England Quarterly Bulletin, May
1987). This continued in the first half
of the 1980’s during the economic
recession, but the dividend payment
has increased significantly since 1985.
The implementation of the divi-
dend imputation system provides stock-
holders with a strong reason for prefer-
ring firms that pay dividends rather
than those that retain earnings since
this system eliminates the double taxa-
tion of dividends. Unlike the classical
system, the imputation system pro-
vides stockholders with a credit for tax
paid by the company on distributed
profits. Under the imputation system,
the firm passes on to the stockholders
the benefit of the ACT payment in the
form of an imputed tax credit. The
stockholders’ income is the dividends
received and the tax credit. The rate of
imputation has been set equal to the
basic rate, so the tax credit satisfies the
basic-rate tax on the shareholders’ in-
come. If the shareholders pay taxes at
the basic rate, the credit eliminates the
tax liability. If the shareholders’ tax
rate is higher than the basic rate, they
will pay an additional tax liability to
the Inland Revenue Service (IRS). If
the shareholders are tax exempt, such
as pension funds, they will receive a
refund (tax credit) from the IRS.
Bond et al. (1995) claim that the
imputation tax system introduces some
distortions which are likely to have
some effect on the level of dividend
payment by the U.K. companies. Fol-
lowing the introduction of imputation
system in 1973, many companies re-
sponded by substantially increasing
their dividends. Tax-exempt investors
such as pension funds are the most
influential stockholders in many the
Figure 1. Dividends and Earnings After Tax of U.K. Industries
(Sample Firms) 1974-1999
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U.K. companies, and their tax prefer-
ence for dividends is likely to result in
high dividend payment.
Figure 1. shows an increasing pat-
tern of dividend payment from 1974 to
1993, while earnings after tax display
a more volatile pattern over the same
period. The upward stickiness in the
trend of the dividend behavior during
that period is consistent with Lintner’s
(1956) findings that companies are re-
luctant to cut dividend payment. The
volatility of earnings after tax coupled
with the relative stability of dividend
payment result in the erratic pattern of
dividend payout ratios as shown in
Figure 2.
Hypothesis Development
The predictions of changes in in-
vestor behavior induced by changes in
the tax regulation can be explained as
follows. In this respect, consider the
effect of the 1997 abolition of tax credit
on demand for dividends. Investors
realize that their returns on common
shares are composed of the dividend
component and the capital gains com-
ponent. For example, prior to the 1997
abolition of tax credit, there was a tax
preference for dividend, especially for
tax-exempt investors such as pension
funds since they received the tax credit
facility from the U.K. government, and
the effective rate for the tax-exempt
shareholders was –25 percent. On the
other hand, the tax rate on capital gains
for the tax-exempt investors was zero.
Following the 1997 abolition of
tax credit, they are no longer entitled to
the payment of tax credit, and the ef-
fective rate of income tax increases to
0 percent. Therefore, the tax prefer-
ence for dividends has significantly
decreased. The most important tax-
exempt investors are pension funds
since they approximately own 30 per-
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Figure 2. Dividend Payout Ratios of U.K. Industries
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cent of the total equity in the U.K.
stock market. Thus, this group repre-
sents a significant class of investors in
the U.K. market, and they may have an
important impact on the dividend policy
of the U.K. companies.
As a result of the abolition of tax
credit on dividends, the tax advantage
of dividend income declines and, ceteris
paribus, the demand for high-dividend-
paying stocks should decrease relative
to that for low-dividend-paying stocks.
Furthermore, the U.K. companies in
aggregate should respond to this de-
clined demand by reducing dividend
payment. Tax-clientele theories sug-
gest that the tax penalty on dividends
suppresses the aggregate dividend pay-
ment. This study desires to examine
whether corporate dividend policy is
set to suit a tax clientele by looking at
the effect of the 1997 abolition of tax
credit on the aggregate dividend pay-
ment. This test will not be a test of the
existence of tax clienteles; instead, it
examines whether tax clientele serves
as a major factor in determining a
company’s dividend policy.
If this study finds that the aggre-
gate dividend payment decreases, it
can be inferred that a company’s divi-
dend policy is set to suit a tax clientele.
Thus, the hypothesis to be tested is that
the 1997 abolition of tax credit on
dividends results in a decrease in the
aggregate dividend payment in order
to satisfy a tax clientele.
Methodology
Two types of empirical tests will
be conducted in this study: (1) the tests
of comparison for dividend payout ra-
tios before and after the abolition of tax
credit on dividends and (2) the tests of
structural shifts in the U.K. compa-
nies’ dividend policies.
 First, this study compares the divi-
dend payout ratios between pre-aboli-
tion (1996-1997) and post-abolition
(1998-1999) periods. Consistent with
the prediction that the abolition of tax
credit on dividends would decrease the
tax preference for dividends, the aver-
age difference in the dividend payout
ratios would be negative (dividend
payout ratios of post-abolition periods
would be smaller than those of pre-
abolition period). The resulting hy-
pothesis is:
H
0
 : 
d
= 0
H
a
 : 
d
 < 0
µ
d 
= the average difference in dividend
payout ratios between the two
periods
This study applies one-tailed
matched-pairs t-test for the sample
firms. The t-test is calculated as fol-
lows:
t
D
 =
d*
s
d
 /   n
240
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business, May - August 2007, Vol. 9, No. 2
where:
X
1
= dividend payout ratios for the
post-abolition period
X
2
= dividend payout ratios for the
pre-abolition period
n = number of sample
The conventional significant level
of 5 percent is used to test this hypoth-
esis. Null hypothesis (H
0
) is rejected if
t
D
 < -t
, n-1
 and thus, there is a signifi-
cant difference between the pre- and
post-abolition mean aggregate divi-
dend payout ratios, and the sample
firms indicate an intention to change
their dividend policies following the
abolition of tax credit on dividends.
The second test is to examine the
structural shift in the dividend policies
of the U.K. companies following the
1997 abolition of tax credit on divi-
dends. Lintner’s (1956) partial-adjust-
ment dividend model is utilized to in-
vestigate the effect of the abolition of
tax credit. Khoury and Smith (1977)
employed Lintner’s dividend model to
examine the effect of the Canadian
Tax Reform of 1972.
To forecast the expected dividend
level, Lintner’s approach uses the fol-
lowing model:
D
j,t
 = 
0
 + 
1
D
j,t-1
 + 
2
E
j,t
 + 
t
where:
D
j,t
= the forecast dividend payment
by the jth company in period t
D
j,t-1
= the previous year’s dividends
E
j,t
= earnings after tax of jth com-
pany in period t,

t
= the stochastic disturbance term
To estimate the coefficients of
Lintner’s model for each company,
this study uses the Generalized Least
Square (GLS) in order to correct the
serial correlation in the error terms and
the lagged dependent variable. The
specific technique of GLS used in this
study is quasi-differencing. Normally,
autocorrelation can be eliminated with
a four-step technique as follows:
1. Lag the data to get D
t-1, 
D
t-2 
and E
t-1
2. Multiply the lagged values by 
(correlation coefficient between 
t
and 
t-1.
), that is, we calculate D
t-1
,
D
t-2 
and E
t-1
3. Define new variables by subtracting
D
t-1
,
 
D
t-2
,
 
and E
t-1
 from the origi-
nal data: Y*
t
 = D
t-1
 - D
t-1
;
X*
1t
= D
 t-2 
- D
 t-2
,
 
and
X*
2t
= E
t-1
 -
 
E
t-1
4. Perform ordinary least square (OLS)
on the transformed data
Y*
t
 = 
o 
+ 
1
 X*
1t 
+ 
2 
X*
2t 
+ v
t
The Durbin-Watson statistic is
applied to test for the serial correla-
tion. When the ordinary least square
(OLS) is performed on the transformed
model, the Durbin-Watson statistic will
be close to 2. Since the v
t
 is well be-
haved, then 
o
, 
1 
and 
2
 will be the
best linear unbiased and efficient esti-
mators (BLUE).
d2 - (d)2/n
n-1
s
d
 =
d* = X
1
 - X
2
 =
d
n
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This study utilizes dividend and
earnings periods of 22 years (1974-
1995) to estimate (in time series) the
partial adjustment model for each com-
pany. Once we obtain the firm-specific
estimates for 
0
, 
 1
, 
 2
,
 
we input them
to forecast the estimates of         for each
year from 1996 to 1999.
The percentage forecasting error,
is then computed for the years of 1996-
1999. The computed percentage fore-
casting error is split into pre- and post-
abolition of tax credit, and the follow-
ing statistical hypothesis is tested.
   H
0
 : 
1
 = 
2
, and
H
a
 : 
1
 < 
2
where: 
1
= the sample mean of the 
for the pre-1997 abolition
period

2
= the sample mean of the 
for the post-1997 abolition
period
To determine whether the aggre-
gate dividend payment changes fol-
lowing the 1997 abolition of tax credit,
this study is applying a statistical test
for the difference in means of two
populations. If this test finds that the
aggregate dividend payment decreases
following the abolition of tax credit,
then it substantiates the hypothesis that
corporate dividend policy is set to suit
a tax clientele.
Empirical Testing and
Findings
First, this study conducts tests to
compare the dividend payout ratios in
the pre-abolition to those in the post-
abolition periods. The pre-abolition
period includes a two-year period be-
fore the abolition of tax credit (1996
and 1997) while the post-abolition
period includes a period of two years
after the abolition (1998 and 1999).
For each company, the pre- and the
post-abolition dividend payout ratios
are estimated as the average of the
annual payout ratios in the respective
period. Consistent with the prediction
Table 5. Matched-Pairs t-Test for the Aggregate Sample.(Dividend Payout
Ratios)Test of Ho :µ = 0 vs Ha: µ < 0
Variable N % Positive Mean SE Mean t-value p- value
Differences Diff.
Differences* 121 61.2 0.022 0.022 1.00 0.84
* Differences is the average of the differences of companies payout ratios between the pre-and post-
abolition period. The sample means for each period are as follows:
Pre-Abolition period: Mean payout ratios is 0.471 and
Post-Abolition period: Mean payout ratios is 0.493

jt
 =
D
jt
 - D
jt
D
jt
)
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that the abolition of tax credit on divi-
dends would decrease the tax prefer-
ence for dividends, this study applies
one-tailed matched-pairs t-test to the
sample of the U.K. companies. This
research tests the null hypothesis that
the mean of the pair-wise differences
over the two periods is equal to zero,
and the alternative hypothesis that this
mean is smaller than zero. The conven-
tional significant level of 5 percent is
used to test this hypothesis. Table 5
presents the results of the matched-
pairs t-test for the aggregate sample.
The percentage of positive differ-
ences in dividend payout ratios in Table
5 shows that 61.2 percent of the com-
panies experienced increases in their
dividend payout ratios following the
1997 abolition of tax credit on divi-
dends. However, the statistical results
show that the null hypothesis of zero
average difference cannot be rejected
at the 5 percent significance level (one-
tailed test). Hence, there is no signifi-
cant difference between the pre- and
the post-abolition mean aggregate divi-
dend payout ratios, and the sample
firms indicated no intention to change
their dividend policies in response to
the abolition of tax credit on divi-
dends.
It is possible that these tests in the
aggregate sample cannot reveal sig-
nificant changes in dividend payout
ratios for different groups of shares.
Prior evidence regarding the existence
of investor tax clienteles across the
dividend yield spectrum suggests the
possibility that a change in tax rate on
dividends could not change investor
preferences with regard to dividends
and capital gains. Robin (1991) con-
ducted a study concerning the impact
of the 1986 Tax Reform Act (this act
equalized the marginal tax rates of
capital gains and dividend income) on
ex-dividend day returns in the U.S.
market. He finds a greater impact of
the 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) on
the high-dividend-yield group than on
the lower-dividend-yield group. This
observation probably contains the im-
pact of dividends captured by Japa-
nese investors. It is also possible that
companies with high dividend payout
ratios in the pre-1986 TRA period
would be reluctant to increase their
dividend payment since the higher divi-
dend payout could not be sustained in
the long-term period.
Consequently, this study classi-
fies the sample companies into five
groups according to their pre-abolition
dividend payout ratios as follows:
Group 1: Dividend Payout Ratios from
0.01 to 0.30 (10 companies)
Group 2: Dividend Payout Ratios from
0.301 to 0.40 (36 compa-
nies)
Group 3: Dividend Payout Ratios from
0.401 to 0.50 (33 compa-
nies)
Group 4: Dividend Payout Ratios from
0.501 to 0.60 (25 compa-
nies)
Group 5: Dividend Payout Ratios
greater than 0.601 (17 com-
panies)
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Subsequently, the matched-pairs
t-test for each group is repeated. The
statistical results reported in Table 6
reveal a slight difference from the test
results using the aggregate sample in
Table 5.
The mean differences of dividend
payout ratios for the four groups are
positive; 0.0865 (Group1), 0.0593
(Group 2), 0.0730 (Group 3), and
0.0539 (Group 4). The mean dividend
payout ratios for these groups in-
creased, respectively, from 0.2035,
0.3621, 0.4491, and 0.5430 in the pre-
abolition period to 0.2900, 0.4214,
0.5221, and 0.5969 in the post-aboli-
tion period. However, the statistical
findings show that the null hypothesis
of zero average difference cannot be
rejected at five percent significance
level (one-tailed test). Thus, there is no
significant difference between the pre-
and post-abolition periods. These find-
ings are similar to the evidence pre-
sented by Bolster and Janjigian (1991)
who examined changes in dividend
policies of the U.S. companies follow-
ing the enactment of 1986 Tax Reform
Act. They also find that dividend pay-
out ratios do not change after the pas-
sage of the tax reform.
The majority of the U.K. firms
indicate no intention to reduce their
dividend payment in response to the
abolition of tax credit on dividends. It
is possible that companies with low to
medium payout ratios in the pre-aboli-
tion period would be reluctant to cut
their dividend payment since this divi-
dend payout could be sustained in the
long run.
Table 6 shows that only a minor-
ity of the U.K. companies (Group 5:
highest payout ratios) experienced de-
creases in their dividend payout ratios,
the mean payout ratios decreased from
0.7960 to 0.5570 between the pre- and
the post-abolition periods. For compa-
nies in Group 5, the null hypothesis of
zero mean of the difference in the pre-
Table 6.Matched-pairs t-tests for 5 Groups of Sample Firms (Dividend
Payout Ratios)
Ho :µ
D 
= 0 vs Ha: µ
D 
< 0
Mean Mean
% Positive Payout Payout Mean SE Mean t- p-
Group N Difference Pre- Post- Diff. Diff. value value
Abolition Abolition
1 10 80.00% 0.2035 0.2900 0.0865 0.0627 1.38 0.90
2 36 75.00% 0.3621 0.4214 0.0593 0.0177 3.35 1.00
3 33 72.70% 0.4491 0.5221 0.0730 0.0254 2.87 1.00
4 25 56.00% 0.5430 0.5969 0.0539 0.0489 1.10 0.86
5 17 11.80% 0.7960 0.5570 -0.2390 0.1030 -2.32 0.017
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and post-abolition periods can be re-
jected at 5 percent confidence level.
Therefore, Group 5 shows a statisti-
cally significant decrease in the divi-
dend payout ratios. Most of the com-
panies in Group 5 (88.2%) experi-
enced a payout decrease whereas only
11.8 percent had a payout ratio in-
crease. Since tax-exempt investors,
such as pension funds, are the prin-
ciple clientele for high-dividend-pay-
out shares, this finding is consistent
with the reduction in the relative tax
advantage of dividend income over
capital gains for these investors as a
result of the 1997 abolition of tax credit
on dividends.
After 1997, most companies in
Group 5 have adjusted their dividend
payout ratios in accordance with the
prediction of tax-based dividend be-
havior model. The effective rate for the
tax-exempt investors was –25 percent,
but after the 1997 abolition of tax credit,
they are no longer entitled to the pay-
ment of tax credit, and the effective
rate of income tax increases to 0 per-
cent. This new tax rate reduces the
relative preference for dividend pay-
ment of investors whose dividend in-
come is taxable at zero rate. Thus, the
demand for high-dividend-paying
shares should decrease relative to low-
dividend-paying shares, and compa-
nies should respond to this declined
demand by reducing dividend payout.
The second test is conducted in
this study to gain further evidence of
the effect of the abolition of tax credit.
Lintner’s (1956) partial-adjustment
dividend model is used to investigate
the structural shift in the dividend poli-
cies of the U.K. companies following
the 1997 abolition of tax credit on
dividends. This model is a valid em-
pirical representation of the
intertemporal behavior of dividend
payment as shown by Fama and Babiak
(1968).They find that Lintner’s model
performs well. Khoury and Smith
(1977) utilized Lintner’s (1956) model
to observe how the dividend policies
of Canadian companies were affected
by a change in tax structure.
Lintner’s model, which forecasts
current dividend level as a function of
past dividend payment and current
earnings, may provide an estimate of
normal expected dividends.
The empirical specification of
Lintner’s model to forecast expected
dividend level is:
D
t
 = 
0
 + 
1
D
t-1
 + 
2
E
t
 + u
t
where D
t
= the forecasted dividend
payment in period t,
D
t-1
= the previous year’s divi-
dends,
E
t
= earnings after tax in pe-
riod t,
u
t
= the stochastic disturbance
term.
This study utilizes dividend and
earnings periods of 22 years (1974-
1995) to estimate (in time series) to
generate Lintner’s model’s coeffi-
cients. After the estimates of 
0
 , 
1
 
, 

2
are obtained,
 
this study uses them to
forecast the estimate of D (expected
)
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dividends) for each of the years 1996-
1999. Subsequently, the percentage of
forecasting error,
is computed for the years 1996-1999.
If the actual dividend payment (Djt) is
zero while the expected dividends (D
jt
)
is not zero, then the company is ex-
cluded from the sample.
This study uses aggregate data as
well as individual company data to test
the structural shift in dividend pay-
ment. In each year, the aggregate divi-
dends and earnings are calculated by
summing, respectively, the company’s
total dividends and earnings. As al-
ready mentioned, 121 companies are
derived from 20 industry groups (sec-
tors); each sector has at least two com-
panies.
Table 7 shows the percentage of
forecast error (
t
) for 20 sectors in the
U.K. industries. A positive number
indicates that dividend payment is
lower than expected. In other words,
Table 7. Percentage of Forecast Error (
jt
)
Sector 1996 1997 1998 1999
1.Med Equip & Supplies -0.039 -0.030 -0.092 -0.135
2. Auto Parts -0.030 0.061 -0.010 0.079
3. Building Materials 0.035 -0.116 2.031 0.111
4. Restaurant, Hotel, Pubs -0.058 -0.033 0.002 0.353
5. Chemicals 0.034 -0.042 -0.045 -0.012
6. Electronic -0.125 -0.019 -0.062 0.137
7 Telecom -0.018 0.009 -0.044 0.050
8. Food & Drug Retailers 0.060 -0.061 0.093 0.090
9. Publishing & Printing -0.199 0.029 -0.021 -0.009
10.Business Support 0.109 0.081 0.059 0.098
11.Distributor -0.040 0.018 -0.280 -0.098
12.House Building -0.099 0.042 0.031 0.110
13.Food Processors 0.027 -0.054 0.071 -0.058
14.Transports -0.119 0.034 0.330 0.297
15.Retailers -0.375 0.070 -0.063 -0.336
16.Defence & Aerospace -0.021 -0.003 0.015 0.149
17.Distiiler & Vintners -0.318 0.227 0.511 -0.651
18.Engineering -0.030 0.001 -0.025 -0.025
19.Oil & Other Mining -0.050 -0.041 0.243 -0.518
20. Other Constructions -0.059 -0.047 -0.131 0.110
Average Forecast Errors -0.066 0.006 0.131 -0.013
)

jt
 =
D
jt
 - D
jt
D
jt
)
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dividend forecasts (D
jt
) using Lintner’s
model are higher than actual dividends
(D
jt
). Meanwhile, a negative value of
forecast error indicates that dividend
forecast is lower than actual dividends
(D
jt
< D
jt
). Table 7 reveals that the aver-
age values of forecast errors for the
years 1996-1999 are negative, indicat-
ing upward shifts in dividend pay-
ment. The positive value in 1998 ap-
parently represents the evidence of a
downward shift as a result of the tax-
credit abolition.
To investigate whether the aggre-
gate dividend payment changed fol-
lowing the 1997 abolition of tax credit,
a statistical test of the difference in
means of two populations was applied.
Table 8 presents the results of two-
sample t-test for pre- and post-aboli-
tion periods. It can be observed from
Table 8 that the percentage of forecast
error in Lintner’s model did not change
between pre- and post-abolition peri-
ods. In other words, the aggregate divi-
dend payment did not decrease follow-
ing the abolition of tax credit.
The resulting p-value is p= 0.13
and since this value is greater than the
significance level of 0.05, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis (µ
1
= µ
2
).
Thus, this test fails to provide a support
for the hypothesis that corporate divi-
dend policy is set in response to a tax
clientele.
As already mentioned, the sample
firms are classified into five groups
according to their pre-abolition divi-
dend payout ratios. Subsequently, this
study repeats the two-sample t-tests
for each group, and the statistical re-
sults are reported in Table 9. These
results are slightly different from the
test results using the aggregate sample
in Table 8. As can be seen from Table
10, the resulting p-value for 4 groups
are p= 0.50 (Group1), p= 0.078 (Group
2), p= 0.79 (Group 3), and p= 0.25
(Group 4). Thus, the null hypothesis
that dividend policy remains un-
changed following the abolition of tax
credit cannot be rejected at the 5 per-
cent significance level (one-tailed test),
or there is no significant difference
between the pre- and post-abolition
periods.Table 9 shows only compa-
nies in Group 5 (the highest payout
ratio); it has a p-value of (p=0.032),
less than a = 0.05. Thus, the null hy-
pothesis of a zero mean of the differ-
ence in the pre- and post-abolition pe-
riods can be rejected at five-percent
Table 8. Two-Sample t-Test
Forecast Errors Pre-Abolition vs. Post-Abolition Periods
N Mean Std. Dev SE Mean
Pre-Abolition 20 Sectors 0.009 0.167 0.037
Post-Abolition 20 Sectors 0.098 0.295 0.066
95% CI for µ Pre-Abolition - µ Post-Abolition : (-0.243, 0.066)
T-Test µ Pre-Abolition = µ Post-Abolition (vs <): T= -1.17 P=0.13 DF= 30
)
)
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Table 9. Two-Sample t-Test per Group Forecast Errors Pre-Abolition vs
Post-Abolition Periods (H
0
 = 0 vs H
a
 < 0)
GROUP 1 N Mean StDev SE Mean
Pre-Abolition 10 0.249 0.799 0.25
Post-Abolition 10 0.246 0.713 0.23
95% CI for µ Pre-Abolition - µ Post-Abolition: ( -0.71, 0.72)
T-Test µ Pre-Abolition = µ Post-Abolition (vs <): T= 0.01 P=0.50 DF= 17
GROUP 2 N Mean StDev SE Mean
Pre-Abolition 36 -0.059 0.223 0.037
Post-Abolition 36 0.035 0.325 0.054
95% CI for µ Pre-Abolition - µ Post-Abolition : ( -0.226, 0.037)
T-Test µ Pre-Abolition = µ Post-Abolition (vs <): T= -1.44 P=0.078 DF= 61
GROUP 3 N Mean StDev SE Mean
Pre-Abolition 33 0.015 0.192 0.033
Post-Abolition 33 -0.017 0.103 0.018
95% CI for µ Pre-Abolition - µ Post-Abolition E: ( -0.045, 0.108)
T-Test µ Pre-Abolition = µ Post-Abolition (vs <): T= 0.82 P=0.79 DF= 49
GROUP 4 N Mean StDev SE Mean
Pre-Abolition 25 0.024 0.133 0.027
Post-Abolition 25 0.140 0.831 0.17
95% CI for µ Pre-Abolition - µ Post-Abolition: (-0.462, 0.23)
T-Test µ Pre-Abolition = µ Post-Abolition (vs <): T= -0.69 P=0.25 DF= 25
GROUP 5 N Mean StDev SE Mean
Pre-Abolition 17 -0.026 0.178 0.043
Post-Abolition 17 0.335 0.73 0.18
95% CI for µ Pre-Abolition - µ Post-Abolition: (-0.746, 0.02)
T-Test µ Pre-Abolition = µ Post-Abolition (vs <): T= -1.98 P=0.032 DF= 17
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confidence level. This finding is con-
sistent with the results in Table 7 where
Group 5 shows a statistically signifi-
cant decrease in the dividend policy.
This evidence supports the hypothesis
that the 1997 abolition of tax credit on
dividends results in the decrease in
aggregate dividend payment in order
to satisfy a tax clientele.
Summary and Conclusions
This study investigates whether
the U.K. corporate dividend policy re-
sponds to the 1997 abolition of tax
credit on dividends. Following the 1997
abolition of tax credit on dividends,
tax-exempt investors are no longer
entitled to the payment of tax credit.
The effective rate of income for tax-
exempt investors such as pension funds
increases from minus -25 percent to 0
percent, and thus the tax preference for
dividends has significantly decreased.
Pension funds approximately own 30
percent of the total equity in the U.K.
stock market. Hence, this group is the
most influential stockholders in many
the U.K. companies, and their tax pref-
erence for dividends may have an im-
portant impact on corporate dividend
policy.
The hypothesis regarding the divi-
dend behavior of the U.K. companies
in response to the tax regulation is
formulated and tested. First, this study
examines the hypothesis that the 1997
abolition of tax credit on dividends
results in a decrease in dividend pay-
out ratios. The findings of the study are
mostly not supportive of this hypoth-
esis. In particular, we find that the
majority of the sample companies
(Group 1, 2, 3, and 4) do not change
their dividend policies after the aboli-
tion of tax credit. On the contrary,
companies in Group 5 with the highest
payout ratios decrease their dividend
payout ratios. This finding is consis-
tent with the view that companies re-
spond to the realignment of the tax rate
on capital gains and dividends by con-
ducting appropriate adjustment to divi-
dend payout ratios.
This study also conducts tests to
investigate whether the aggregate divi-
dend payment changes following the
1997 abolition of tax credit. This study
finds that the percentage of forecast
error in Lintner’s model does not
change between pre- and post-aboli-
tion periods In other words, the aggre-
gate dividend payment does not de-
crease following the abolition of tax
credit.
Overall, the findings of this study
provide evidence that the majority of
the sample companies do not change
their dividend policy in accordance
with the tax-based predictions follow-
ing the 1997 abolition of tax credit on
dividends. For such companies, other
factors such as information release and
signaling may have greater impacts on
their dividend policies. Only the mi-
nority of the sample experience a de-
cline in their dividend payment. This
evidence supports the hypothesis that
the abolition of tax credit on dividends
results in a decrease in aggregate divi-
dend payment in order to satisfy a tax
clientele.
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Obviously, this study has some
limitations. Even though the sample is
representative, the sample size is not
large. Furthermore, since the study uses
two years of experiences after the 1997
abolition of tax credit on dividends and
only annual data available, these may
reduce the strength of any findings
from this study.
References
Ashton, D. J. 1991. Corporate financial policy: American analytics and U.K. taxation.
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 18 (4): 465-482.
Asquith, P., and D. W. Mullins. 1983. The impact of initiating dividend payments on
shareholders’ wealth. Journal of Business 56 (1): 77 - 96.
Baker, H. K., G. E. Farrelly, and R. B. Edelman. 1985. A survey of management views
on dividend policy. Financial Managment: 78-84.
Bank of England. 1987. Companies’ long-term financial decision; dividends and Debt.
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin (May): 261.
Beales, G. 1998. 1998-1999 Income Tax and NIC for the Self-employed Handbook.
Surrey: Croner Publication Ltd.
Benartzi S, R. Michaely., and R Thaler. 1997. Do changes in dividends signal the future
or the Past? Journal of Finance: 1007-1034.
Benito, A., and G. Young. 2003. Hard times or great expectations? Dividend omissions
and dividend cuts by U.K. Firms. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 65 (5):
531-555.
Bolster,P. J., and V. Janjigian. 1991. Dividend policy and valuation effects of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. National Tax Journal (December): 511-518.
Bond, S., L. Chennels, and M. Devereux. 1995. Company dividends and taxes in the UK.
Fiscal Studies 16 (3).
Brenan, M. J. 1970. Taxes, market valuation and corporate financial policy. National Tax
Journal 23: 417.
Brigham, E. J., and L. C. Gapenski. 1987. Intermediate Financial Management (2nd ed.).
The Dryden Press.
Brown, G. 1997. Budget statement. HANSARD-Parliamentary Debate, House of Com-
mons Official Report 297 (33): 306.
Butterworths. 1997. Simon’s Direct Tax Service: Budget Bulletin 1997. Scotland:
Thomson Litho Ltd.
Central Statistical Office. 1994. Annual supplement 1994 edition. Economic Trends: 100.
Chui, A ., N. Strong, and J. Cadle. 1992. The empirical significance of tax effects on the
valuation of dividends: The U.K. evidence. Journal of Business Finance and
Accounting 19 (4): 515-532.
250
Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business, May - August 2007, Vol. 9, No. 2
Dyl , E. A., and J. R. Hoffmeister. 1986. A note on dividend policy and beta. Journal of
Business Finance and Accounting 13 (1): 107-115.
Easterbrook, F. H. 1984. Two agency-cost explanations of dividends. The American
Economic Review LXXIV (4): 650.
Elton, E. J., and M. J. Gruber. 1970. Marginal stockholder tax rates and the clientele effect.
The Review of Economics and Statistics  LII (1): 68-74.
Fama, E. F., and H. Babiak. 1968. Dividend policy: An empirical analysis. The Journal
of the American Statistical Association 63: 1132-1161.
Farrar, D. and L. Selwyn. 1967. Taxes, corporate financial policy and return to investors.
National Tax Journal: 444-454.
Feldstein, M. S. 1970. Corporate taxation and dividend behaviour. Review of Economic
Studies 37: 57-72
Foreman, A. 1998. Tax Handbook 1998-1999. London: Allied Dunbar Assurance plc.
Hakansson, N. H. 1982. To pay or not to pay dividend. Journal of Finance XXXVII (2):
415.
Jensen, M.C (1986), Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers, The
American Economic Review 76 (2): 323-329.
Kay, J. A and M. A. King. 1990. The British Tax System (5th ed.). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Khoury N. T., and K. V.  Smith. 1977. Dividend policy and capital gain tax in Canada.
Journal of Business Administration 8: 19-37.
Lakonishok, J., and T. Vermaelen. 1983. Tax reform and ex-dividend day behaviour.
Journal of Finance XXXVIII (4): 1157.
Lasfer, M. A. 1995. Ex-day behaviour: Tax or short-term trading effects. Journal of
Finance L (3): 875 – 897.
Lasfer, M. A. 1996. Taxes and dividends: The UK evidence. Journal of Banking and
Finance 20: 455.
Lintner, J. 1956. Distribution of incomes of corporations among dividends, retained
earnings, and taxes. American Economic Review (46).
Litzenberger, R. H., and K. Ramaswamy. 1982. The effect of dividend on common stock
prices: Tax effect or information effect. Journal of Finance XXXVII: 429.
Miller, M. H., and K. Rock. 1985. Dividend policy under asymmetric information.
Journal of Finance 40: 1031
Miller, M. H., and F. Modigliani. 1961. Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of
shares. Journal of Business XXXIV (4): 411-433.
Nissim, D. and A. Ziv. 2001. Dividend changes and future profitability. The Journal of
Finance LVL (6): 2111-2133.
Papaioannou, G. J., and C. M. Savarese. 1994. Corporate dividend policy response to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986. Journal of The Financial Management Association. 23 (1):
56-65.
251
Basuki—The Response of Corporate Dividend Policy to The Abolition of Tax ...
Penman, S. H. 1983. The predictive content of earnings forecasts and dividends. Journal
of Finance XXXVIII (4): 1181-1199
Pettit, R. R. 1972. Dividend announcements, security performance, and capital market
efficiency. Journal of Finance XXVII (5).
Pettit R. R. 1977. Taxes, transaction cost and clientele effect of dividend. Journal of
Financial Economics: 419.
Poterba , J., and L. H. Summer. 1984. New evidence that taxes affect the valuation of
Dividends. Journal of Finance: 1397-1415
Poterba, J. M. 1987. Tax policy and corporate saving. Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity (2): 455-503.
Ridgway, P. 1997. Imputation system – born 1973; died 3 July 1997 RIP? Taxation 139
(3614): 390.
Robin, A. J. 1991. The impact of the 1986 tax reform act on ex-dividend day returns.
Journal of Financial Management Association 20 (1): 60-70.
Ryan, T. M. 1974. Dividend policy and market valuation in British industry. Journal of
Business Finance and Accounting 1 (3): 415-428.
Shefrin, H. M., and M. Statman. 1984. Explaining investor preference for cash dividend.
Journal of Financial Economics 13 (2): 253-282.
Theobald, M. 1978. Intertemporal dividend models: An empirical analysis using recent
U.K. data. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting: 123-135.
Tingley, K. R. 1999. Income Tax Guide 1999-2000. Daily Mail, Orion Business Book.
Van Horne, J. C. 1983. Financial Management and Policy (6th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Watts, R. 1973. The information content of dividends. Journal of Business 46: 191-211.
Woolridge, J. R. 1983. Dividend changes and security prices. Journal of Finance
XXXVIII (5): 1607 – 1615.
Zodrow, G. R. 1991. On the traditional and new views of dividend taxation. National Tax
Journal XLIV: 497-509.
